Blashfield, R. K., Keeley, J. W., Flanagan, E. H., & Miles, S. R. (2014). The Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol, 10, 25-51
ברוכים הבאים! בלוג זה נועד לספק משאבים לפסיכולוגים חינוכיים ואחרים בנושאים הקשורים לדיאגנוסטיקה באורייטנצית CHC אבל לא רק.
בבלוג יוצגו מאמרים נבחרים וכן מצגות שלי וחומרים נוספים.
אם אתם חדשים כאן, אני ממליצה לכם לעיין בסדרת המצגות המופיעה בטור הימני, שכותרתה "משכל ויכולות קוגניטיביות".
Welcome! This blog is intended to provide assessment resources for Educational and other psychologists.
The material is CHC - oriented , but not entirely so.
The blog features selected papers, presentations made by me and other materials.
If you're new here, I suggest reading the presentation series in the right hand column – "intelligence and cognitive abilities".
נהנית מהבלוג? למה שלא תעקוב/תעקבי אחרי?
Enjoy this blog? Become a follower!
Followers
Search This Blog
Friday, June 24, 2016
The Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5 - part 2
Blashfield, R. K., Keeley, J. W., Flanagan, E. H., & Miles, S. R. (2014). The Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol, 10, 25-51
Allen Frances, M.D DSM 5 Is Guide Not
Bible—Ignore Its Ten Worst Changes. https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201212/dsm-5-is-guide-not-bible-ignore-its-ten-worst-changes
This is part two of the
post the Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5 published on June
23, 2016.
DSM4
DSM4 was published in 1994. A
major change from previous editions was the inclusion of a clinical
significance criterion to almost half of all the categories, which required
that symptoms cause "clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning".
DSM4TR
DSM4TR was published in 1994. The diagnostic categories and most of the
specific criteria for diagnosis were not changed in this edition.
In 2005 Sadler published an important and
influential book titled "Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis". Sadler highlighted five values and the roles
they play in psychiatric nosology: (a) aesthetics—how people prefer things to
be, in the sense that they “like” or “appreciate” them; (b)
epistemology—choices about how we know what we know about classification (i.e.,
what research methods we prefer); (c) ethics—what morals the classification
upholds; (d ) ontology—what is the fundamental nature of “things,” or in the
case of psychiatry, what mental disorders are in a (meta)physical sense; and
(e) pragmatics—how useful or user-friendly the classification might be. Until
the publication of this book, most (although not all) of those assumptions were
ignored or taken for granted. This book legitimized the imperative role
philosophical discourse plays in the development of a classification of mental
disorders.
DSM5
DSM5 was published in 2013, but the
process of its development began in 1999.
Its drafts were published on an internet site, allowing people to remark
and make suggestions. The purpose of the
DSM5 task force was to match the classification system to modern molecular
biology, cognitive and affective neuroscience, and psychometrics. The suggested categories were tested in
eleven medical centers. The total number
of diagnostic categories in this classification system increased markedly. Most
of this increase was in categories which covered a vast range of reasons why
someone might be seen by a mental health professional (e.g., “overweight or
obesity,” “problems related to unwanted pregnancy”).
The axes system that existed since the
DSM3 was cancelled. DSM5 has three
parts:
Part one describes the structure of the
DSM5.
Part two describes the mental disorder
categories. Significant changes in the fifth edition are the deletion of the
subtypes of schizophrenia and the
deletion of the subsets of autistic spectrum disorder. The chapter that included disorders first
diagnosed in infancy, childhood or adolescence was also deleted.
The third part introduces
innovative models and measurement tools. Among them is an alternative model for
personality disorders, which is a hybrid model (categorical and dimensional). There
was a debate during the period preceding the DSM5 whether and how dimensional
models of personality can be integrated into the DSM. One of these models is the BIG5 model, about
which I had briefly written before.
Mental
health professionals and the British Psychological Society argue that "normal" and
"abnormal" personalities are not separate but exist on the same
continuum. It's possible to classify an
"abnormal" personality by the same BIG5 factors. It was suggested that the categories of
personality disorders in the DSM5 be replaced by dimensional models of
personality. Blashfield and Keeley write that the political pressures against such a significant
change were powerful, and the next version of the proposal involved a hybrid of
categories and dimensions. Some people
argued that adopting a dimensional model of personality was not in the financial
interest of the APA because copyrights for existing measurement instruments for
these dimensions were held by others.
Other
DSM5 criticisms:
The way
the categories were built: the DSM deals mainly with
the symptoms of mental disorders and not with their causes. It classifies disorders based on statistical
or clinical patterns. This method can
cause the classification of people who have the same symptoms for different
reasons or due to different causes into the same category. This encumbers research efforts. But what's the alternative? I'm not sure we have enough knowledge to
enable us to classify mental disorders according to their causes.
Over-diagnosis
and medicalization of normal life situations:
some professionals argue that the great
increase in the number of diagnostic categories reflects and causes an
increased medicalization of human nature, and may cause over-diagnosis of
mental disorders. One of the people
arguing this is Dr. Allen Frances, the head of the task force of the DSM4. He argues that normal life situations, like
temper tantrums or natural grief, become mental disorders in the DSM5.
The extent
to which the DSM structure is in line with the way clinicians diagnose in real
life: Research about the way experienced
clinicians make diagnostic decisions show that they are not using criteria
lists. Instead they compare the new
patient with patients they have seen previously using a prototype. Thus some professionals argue that the DSM
diagnostic criteria fit research more than clinical practice (but see one of
the previous points…). Blashfield and Keeley
suggest that prototypes would be
a better way for clinicians to learn and communicate diagnostic categories once
the categories are well defined with feature lists (i.e., criteria).
The DSM5
writing process: controversy erupted over the potentially
secretive process that was being used to make decisions as well as the
corrupting influence of income and the DSM's potential revenues. More than
once, important decisions that affected the final outcome of a DSM
categorization system were made at the level of the Board of Trustees of the
APA.
Blashfield and Keeley recommend that the APA make all financial
records about the DSM, both past and present, publicly available. This would
include information about royalties (if any) and honoraria paid to individuals
involved with these editions and funding from pharmaceutical or other companies
that could experience a financial impact because of DSM-influenced decisions.
Thursday, June 23, 2016
The Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5 - part 1
Blashfield, R. K., Keeley, J. W., Flanagan, E. H., & Miles, S. R. (2014). The Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol, 10, 25-51.
The struggles and controversies surrounding
mental disorder definitions in the various DSMs remind me of the struggles surrounding
learning disability definition. This is
one of the reasons it's good to know them.
DSM = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders
This paper reviews DSM development. The paper
uses the term "patients" to describe people in need of psychiatric intervention
and, thus, DSM definitions. I'll use the
term "patients" in this post following this paper. The way we name or refer to our customers
reflects a value judgement, to my opinion (I prefer to call them "clients"). This is also the case with the way we name our
clients' problems (this paper names them "mental disorders").
Here are some interesting points from
this paper.
We begin with this fascinating table:
NAME
|
PUBLICATION YEAR
|
NUMBER OF PAGES
|
NUMBER OF DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES
|
PRICE IN DOLLARS
|
REVENUE FOR THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
|
DSM1
|
1952
|
132
|
128
|
3$
|
UNKNOWN
|
DSM2
|
1968
|
119
|
193
|
3.5$
|
1.27
|
DSM3
|
1980
|
494
|
228
|
31.75$
|
9.33
|
DSM3R
|
1987
|
567
|
253
|
NOT WRITTEN IN THE PAPER
|
16.65
|
DSM4
|
1994
|
886
|
383
|
$48.95
|
120
|
DSM4TR
|
2000
|
943
|
383
|
$74.95
|
UNKNOWN
|
DSM5
|
2013
|
947
|
541
|
$199
|
UNKNOWN
|
DSM1
Following the Second World War, there
were four classification systems of mental disorders in the US. The
American Psychiatric Association (APA) decided to overcome this “Tower of
Babel” situation by creating a classification that would be acceptable to all
members of its organization and that could unify the diagnostic terms of its
psychiatrists. The result was the DSM1. DSM-I
had a hierarchical system in which the initial node in the hierarchy was
differentiating organic brain syndromes from “functional” disorders. The
functional disorders were further subdivided into psychotic versus neurotic
versus character disorders. This organization roughly followed the
decision-making process of clinicians.
The
DSM-I descriptions of disorders were prose paragraphs that incorporated
behavioral and trait-like criteria. The terms in the description were relative
and left to the interpretation of the clinician, leading to problems with
reliability across professionals.
DSM2
DSM2 published in 1968 was the result of
an effort to unite the classification systems in the world. It was organized in a similar way as the DSM1. Many of the new categories added in the
DSM-II were categories of relevance to outpatient mental health efforts.
In 1971 Kendell et al conducted a study
in which a set of eight videotapes of patients from the United States and Great
Britain were shown to groups of American and British psychiatrists. For all
eight videotapes, the modal diagnosis by the American clinicians was
schizophrenia. In contrast, some of the videotapes, in the opinion of the
British psychiatrists, represented patients with manic-depressive disorders,
schizophrenia, and personality disorders. The results, that showed there are still
differences in diagnoses between professionals in different countries, were
considered as evidence that Americans tended to be over inclusive in their use
of schizophrenia as a diagnosis.
In 1973 Rosenhan published a provocative
paper in Science about how a group of colleagues went to different inpatient
facilities in the United States requesting admission. They were truthful about
themselves during the intake interview except for two things: (a) they gave
fictitious names so that their admissions would not appear on their future
medical records, and (b) they reported hearing a voice saying “Empty” or
“Thud.” All were admitted with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Their average
length of stay in the inpatient facility was nineteen days (the total range was
7 to 52 days). When discharged, most of them were given a diagnosis of
“schizophrenia, in remission.” Rosenhan and his colleagues noted that most of
the patients in the facilities spotted that they were fakes, but none of the
pseudopatients were detected by the hospital staff. Rosenhan concluded that
inpatient facilities of the time could not differentiate the sane from the
insane. Rosenhan’s paper stirred up a
firestorm of reactions
.
These and other studies were stimuli for
changes in the DSM3.
DSM3
Publishing the DSM-III in 1980 was part
of a paradigm shift in psychiatry (and the mental health field in general).
Prior to the DSM-III, psychiatry was dominated by psychoanalytically trained
psychiatrists. These psychoanalysts saw little value to clinical diagnosis for
working with psychotherapy patients. In contrast, the main authors of the
DSM-III attempted to bring psychiatry back to its medical roots. Their ideas fit
well with the transition in treatment focus from psychotherapy to the use of
medications.
The DSM3 authors will to drop the term
"neurosis" from the DSM raised a lot of controversy among
professionals. A compromised was reached
in which the word "neurosis" appeared in parenthesis following the
word "disorder" in specific cases.
Robert Spitzer, who was the head of the
DSM-III and the organizing committee for the DSM-III took the bold step of
proposing a tentative definition of the concept of mental disorder. They needed
this definition because an explicit goal of the creators of the DSM-III was to
avoid speculations about the causal mechanisms (especially theoretical concepts
couched in psychoanalytic terms) that explained psychopathology. This
definition was also in direct contrast to the antipsychiatry movement that
attempted to define a mental disorder as society’s way of dealing with
undesirable people—by labeling them with a mental disorder to keep them quiet
and segregated.
The definition in the DSM-III was: Each
of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant
behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual
and that is typically associated with either a painful symptom (distress) or
impairment in one or more important areas of functioning (disability). In
addition, there is an inference that there is a behavioral, psychological, or
biological dysfunction, and that the disturbance is not only in the
relationship between the individual and the society.
The DSM-III definition of mental disorder
led to an interesting and growing discussion of psychiatric classification by
philosophers, cognitive psychologists, social anthropologists, and historians.
The DSM-III contained diagnostic criteria
to specify the meaning of the categories. In addition, for each category, there
was a description of the typical demographic profile of patients experiencing
this disorder, a lengthy prose explanation of what the category meant, a
description of how to differentiate the target category from any other category
with which it might be confused, and a brief discussion of what was known, if
anything, about the course and onset of the disorder. Another innovation to the
DSM-III was that the system was multiaxial. Each patient was expected to be
diagnosed along five separate axes: (a) the descriptive presentation of the
patient (i.e., the mental disorder categories), (b) the underlying personality
and/or intellectual disorder, (c) any associated medical disorder that was
relevant to the patient’s psychiatric presentation, (d ) the psychosocial
stressors in the patient’s environment, and (e) the patient’s highest level of
adaptive functioning in the past year.
After
the publication of the DSM-III, Spitzer and his colleagues created the SCID
(Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R). By the
year 2000 there were over 240 instruments to measure various aspects of
psychopathology and mental disorders. The
reliability of diagnostic assessment using these new instruments generally was
a distinct improvement over what had been found in the pre-DSM-III research.
Spitzer & Fleiss’s (1974) review of pre-DSM-III reliability research showed
estimates of interclinician agreement typically ranging from 0.4 to 0.6. Using
structured interviews like the SCID, reliability estimates were distinctly
higher, typically in the range of 0.75 to 0.90. Because of the clearly defined
method for assigning psychopathology, along with improved reliability, structured
interviews would soon dominate the research world although even today they are
rarely used in clinical practice.
How reflective was the DSM3 structure of
the "natural" way clinicians conducted diagnoses?
Cantor et al. (1980) had 13 mental health
clinicians list the features that they associated with nine DSM-II diagnostic
categories of psychosis. Any feature that was chosen by at least 3 of the 13
clinicians was kept for the final feature list. Then they took twelve case
histories of patients that had been given one of four psychotic diagnoses
(manic, depressed, paranoid schizophrenia, and undifferentiated schizophrenia).
Four cases were considered to be quite prototypical of the four diagnoses
(i.e., these four cases contain almost all of the features generated by the 13
clinicians), four were moderately prototypical, and four were not typical
(i.e., these four cases had four or less of the defining features generated by
the 13 clinicians). These case histories were given to the clinicians to
diagnose. The reliability of the diagnoses varied as a function of the
prototypicality of the case histories, with the least prototypical cases having
the lowest reliability. This research and
others suggested that clinicians did not
use diagnostic criteria to make diagnoses. Clinicians’ diagnoses tended to follow a
prototype-matching model rather than a criteria-based model.
DSM3R
DSM3R that was published in 1987 was not
structurally different than the DSM3 (it had the axis system, used diagnostic
criteria and the mental disorders were organized in a similar way) but it
contained new categories.
The political struggles concerning the
DSM-III centered around a battle between a psychoanalytic faction of the APA
and a biologically-oriented faction. When the DSM-III-R was being created, the
focus of controversy shifted. Feminists were concerned with proposals by the
DSM-III-R committees for new categories such as premenstrual syndrome and
masochistic PD. As a result of the controversy, the DSM-III-R added a new
appendix to its classifications called “Proposed diagnostic categories needing
further study.” Contained in this appendix were three categories: late luteal
phase dysphoric disorder (the new name for premenstrual syndrome), sadistic PD
(to balance masochistic PD), and self-defeating PD (the new name for
masochistic PD).
In 1992, WAKEFIELD raised attention the
fact that a value judgment is necessary to instantiate any definition of mental
disorder. The same symptoms might be judged as
disordered in one context but not in another. Further, as societal and
individual values change over time, some conditions that used to be disordered
will no longer be considered abnormal (e.g., homosexuality), and others that
were not disordered might become problematic (e.g., Internet use). Thus, there
can never be a “final” version of the DSM.
To be continued in a following post…
Sunday, June 19, 2016
DSM1 עד DSM5 – מעגל הסיווגים: חלק שני
DSM1 עד DSM5 – מעגל
הסיווגים: חלק שני
זהו חלק שני של פוסט שפורסם בתאריך 17 ביוני.
Blashfield, R. K., Keeley, J. W., Flanagan, E. H., & Miles, S. R. (2014). The Cycle of Classification: DSM-I Through DSM-5. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol, 10, 25-51
Allen Frances, M.D DSM 5 Is Guide Not Bible—Ignore Its Ten Worst Changes. https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201212/dsm-5-is-guide-not-bible-ignore-its-ten-worst-changes
DSM4
DSM4 פורסם בשנת 1994. השינוי
העיקרי בו היה הוספת קריטריון החשיבות הקלינית בכמעט חצי מהקטגוריות. קריטריון זה דרש שהסימפטומים יגרמו מצוקה או
פגיעה משמעותית מבחינה קלינית בתפקוד החברתי, התעסוקתי או בתחומי תפקוד
אחרים.
DSM4TR
DSM4TR פורסם
בשנת 2000. הקטגוריות הדיאגנוסטיות ומרבית
הקריטריונים הספציפים לדיאגנוזה לא השתנו.
בשנת 2005 פרסם SADLER ספר חשוב ומשפיע בשם VALUES AND PSYCHIATRIC
DIAGNOSIS. סדלר
כתב על חמישה ערכים והתפקיד שלהם בסיווגים פסיכיאטרית: א.
אסתטיקה – כיצד אנשים מעדיפים שהדברים יהיו, במובן של הדרך בה הם
"אוהבים" או "מעריכים" אותם.
ב. אפיסטמולוגיה – בחירות שאנו
עושים לגבי הדרך בה אנו רוכשים ידע על סיווגים (למשל, באילו שיטות מחקר אנו
מעדיפים להשתמש). ג. אתיקה – הערכים המוסריים הבאים לידי ביטוי
במערכת הסיווג. ד. אונטולוגיה – הטבע הבסיסי של
"הדברים", או במקרה של פסיכיאטריה, המהות של הפרעות נפשיות במובן
ה(מטא)פיסי. ה. פרגמטיקה – עד כמה הסיווג שימושי או ידידותי
למשתמש. (אני לא בטוחה שהייתי קוראת לחמשת
הדברים הללו "ערכים"). עד פרסום
ספר זה, אנשי מקצוע התעלמו מדברים אלה או התייחסו אליהם כמובן מאליו. הספר הפך את התפקיד שהשיח הפילוסופי משחק
בהתפתחות סיווגי הפרעות הנפש ללגיטימי.
DSM5
DSM5 פורסם בשנת 2013, אך תהליך הפיתוח שלו החל בשנת 1999. הטיוטות פורסמו באתר באינטרנט ואיפשרו לאנשים
להעיר ולהציע. המטרה היתה להתאים את מערכת
הסיווג לממצאים מתחום הביולוגיה המולקלורית, הפסיכולוגיה הקוגניטיבית, מדעי המוח והפסיכומטריקה. הקטגוריות שהוצעו נבחנו באחד עשר מרכזים
רפואיים. ב – DSM5 קיימת עליה בקטגוריות שמכסות טווח רחב של סיבות
שבעטיין אנשים עשויים לפנות לפסיכיאטר ("השמנת יתר"; "בעיות
הקשורות להריון בלתי רצוי").
ב – DSM5 בוטלה מערכת הצירים שהיתה קיימת מאז ה – DSM3. ה – DSM5 מחולק לשלושה חלקים:
החלק הראשון מתאר את ארגון ה – DSM5.
החלק השני מתאר את כל ההפרעות.
שינויים בולטים בחלק זה הם ביטול תת הסוגים של סכיזופרניה וביטול תת הסוגים
של הפרעה על הספקטרום האוטיסטי. כמו כן
בוטל הפרק שכלל "הפרעות שמאובחנות לראשונה בינקות, בילדות או בגיל
ההתבגרות".
בחלק השלישי מוצגים מדדים ומודלים חדשניים. בין השאר מוצג בו מודל אלטרנטיבי להפרעות
אישיות, שהוא מודל היברידי (מימדי – קטגוריאלי).
בתקופה שקדמה ל – DSM5 התעורר ויכוח האם וכיצד ניתן לשלב מודלים מימדיים של האישיות ב – DSM. אחד
המודלים הללו הוא מודל חמשת התכונות הגדולות – ה – BIG5, עליו כתבתי בעבר.
אנשי מקצוע וכן החברה הפסיכולוגית הבריטית טוענים שאישיות
"נורמלית" ו"אבנורמלית" אינן נפרדות זו מזו אלא נמצאות על פני
רצף. ניתן לסווג אישיות
"אבנורמלית" על פי אותן חמש תכונות גדולות. לקראת יצירת DSM5 הוצע להחליף את כל הקטגוריות של הפרעות אישיות ב – DSM במודלים מימדיים של אישיות. Blashfield and Keeley טוענים שהופעלו לחצים פוליטים חזקים נגד שינוי זה,
ולכן נוצר המודל ההיברידי של קטגוריות (סימפטומים שמאפיינים הפרעות אישיות שונות,
ובכך יוצרים "קטיעה" בין מה שנחשב "נורמלי" למה שנחשב
ל"אבנורמלי") ושל מימדים. היו
טענות שלאיגוד הפסיכיאטרי האמריקני לא היה אינטרס כלכלי לאמץ מודלים מימדיים של
אישיות מכיוון שהזכויות לכלי המדידה של מימדים אלה היו בידי אחרים.
ביקורות נוספות על ה – DSM5:
הדרך בה הקטגוריות נבנו: ה – DSM עוסק בעיקר בסימפטומים של הפרעות
נפשיות ולא בגורמים להן. הוא מקבץ את
ההפרעות בהתבסס על דפוסים סטטיסטים או קלינים.
דרך זו עלולה לגרום לקיבוץ של אנשים שיש להם אותם סימפטומים אבל שיתכן
שהגורמים לסימפטומים אלה שונים לחלוטין ובכך היא מכבידה על התקדמות המחקר. אך מהי האלטרנטיבה? אני לא בטוחה שיש לנו מספיק
ידע שיאפשר לקבץ הפרעות נפשיות לפי הגורמים להן.
אבחון יתר ומדיקליזציה של מצבים
נורמלים: יש טענות על כך שההרחבה הניכרת במספר הקטגוריות הדיאגנוסטיות משקפת
וגורמת למדיקליזציה גוברת של טבע האדם, ועלולה לגרום לאבחנת יתר של הפרעות נפשיות. אחד הטוענים זאת הוא ד"ר Allen Frances, מנהל צוות המשימה של ה – DSM4. הוא טוען שמצבי חיים נורמלים, כמו TEMPER TANTRUMS או אבל טבעי הופכים להפרעות נפשיות ב – DSM5.
עד כמה מבנה ה – DSM עולה
בקנה אחד עם הדרך בה קלינאים מאבחנים בשטח: במחקרים על הדרך בה קלינאים מנוסים מקבלים
החלטות דיאגנוסטיות עולה שהם אינם משתמשים ברשימות קריטריונים כאשר הם מקבלים
החלטות דיאגנוסטיות. במקום זה הם מתאימים/משווים
בין הפציינט החדש לפציינטים שהם ראו קודם
תוך שימוש בפרוטוטיפ/אב טיפוס. ולכן יש
טענה שהקריטריונים הדיאגנוסטים ב – DSM מתאימים
יותר למחקר מאשר לעבודה קלינית (אך ראה נקודת ביקורת קודמת...). מחברי המאמר (Blashfield and Keeley) כותבים שייתכן שעדיף שיהיו ב – DSM תיאורים
פרוטוטיפים.
תהליך חיבור ה – :DSMה – DSM5 עורר
ביקורת לגבי הדרך הסודית בה תהליך חיבורו התנהל וההשפעה המשחיתה האפשרית של
הרווחים הפוטנציאלים של האגודה הפסיכיאטרית האמריקנית ממנו. החלטות חשובות לגבי קטגוריות של הפרעות נפשיות התקבלו
על ידי חבר הנאמנים של האיגוד הפסיכיאטרי האמריקני.
מחברי המאמר ממליצים שב – DSM הבא תהיה שקיפות גדולה יותר לגבי זכויות
ותשלומים שמקבלים אנשים המעורבים ביצירת ה – DSM, ולגבי מימון על ידי חברות תרופות או חברות
אחרות שיכולות להיות מושפעות כלכלית מהחלטות לגבי DSM, וכו'.
חברים רבים בצוות הפיתוח של ה – DSM5 היו בעלי קשרים כלכליים לחברות תרופות.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)